Fordham Law Review
Volume 73

Issue 2

Article 15

2004

Euclid Lives? The Uneasy Legacy of Progressivism in Zoning
Eric R. Claeys

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Eric R. Claeys, Euclid Lives? The Uneasy Legacy of Progressivism in Zoning, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 731
(2004).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol73/iss2/15

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

Euclid Lives? The Uneasy Legacy of Progressivism in Zoning
Cover Page Footnote
Assistant Professor of Law, St. Louis University. This Essay was supported by a research grant from the
Claremont Institute Center for Local Government. It benefited from presentations at the American
Political Science Association 2003 Annual Conference, Washington University School of Law, University of
Colorado School of Law, and Wake Forest University School of Law. I am grateful to Dan Mandelker, Lee
Fennell, Nicole Garnett, Stephanie Stern, and Phil Weiser for their comments and criticisms, and to Matt
Jagger for his research assistance.

This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol73/iss2/15

ESSAYS
EUCLID LIVES? THE UNEASY LEGACY OF
PROGRESSIVISM IN ZONING
Eric R. Claeys*
INTRODUCTION

When land-use law needs to explain how zoning came into being, it
tells a well-known tale: Once upon a time, most cities and towns did
not use centralized planning. During the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, most cities regulated land use legislatively for only a few
targeted problems, but in general, they relied on decentralized judicial
regulation based on the common law of nuisance. Although nuisancebased regulation was incoherent and not particularly effective, easy
access to land prevented most conflicts from getting out of hand. By
the early 1900s, however, the American frontier had closed. The
motor-powered
growing
cities, and
Industrial Revolution,
As these
transportation all created intense land-use conflicts.
pressures mounted, Americans gradually decided that they could not
live any longer with judge- and nuisance-based land-use regulation.
The heroes in this morality play, of course, are the expert planners
and lawyers who introduced modern zoning-and also the U.S.
Supreme Court, which surprised most observers and gave zoning a
generous endorsement in the 1926 decision Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.'

* Assistant Professor of Law, St. Louis University. This Essay was supported by a
research grant from the Claremont Institute Center for Local Government. It
benefited from presentations at the American Political Science Association 2003
Annual Conference, Washington University School of Law, University of Colorado
School of Law, and Wake Forest University School of Law. I am grateful to Dan
Mandelker, Lee Fennell, Nicole Garnett, Stephanie Stern, and Phil Weiser for their
comments and criticisms, and to Matt Jagger for his research assistance.
1. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The account in the text was synthesized from Euclid. See
id. at 386-97; David L. Callies et al., Cases and Materials on Land Use 12-13 (3d ed.
1999); Jesse Dukeminier & James Krier, Property 747, 750-53, 951-56 (5th ed. 2002);
Morton Gitelman et al., Cases and Materials on Land Use 281-82 (6th ed. 1997);
Daniel R. Mandelker, Land Use Law § 1.04 (5th ed. 2003); Joseph William Singer,
Property Law: Rules, Policies, and Practices 1048-55 (3d ed. 2002).
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Although this tale is familiar, it is difficult to exaggerate how

profoundly it has influenced American law. In the words of one
leading property casebook, Euclid now serves "as a generous
endorsement of social engineering in the name of public health,
safety, and welfare."2 That endorsement provides zoning with
political and legal legitimacy. It also exerts subtle but powerful
pressure elsewhere throughout the law of property. Thus, in the
1930s, when the drafters of the Restatement of Torts restated nuisance

law, they quietly dropped the conception of property rights that had
previously informed the law and shifted to a utilitarian interestbalancing formula heavily influenced by legal realism.3 More recently,
this metaphorical understanding of Euclid has exerted a powerful drag
on the law of regulatory takings. The Rehnquist Court briefly flirted
with the idea of expanding regulatory takings law,' but the Justices'

attachment to zoning-to Euclid-put an end to these flirtations
before they ever became serious.'
Charles Haar and Michael Allan Wolf celebrate this vision of landuse regulation in a recent essay, Euclid Lives.6 Haar and Wolf use
Euclid as a metaphor to describe the principles of property law and
land-use regulation most closely associated with zoning: flexibility in

the face of changing circumstances, broad conceptions of the public
interest, a fluid understanding of the "property" associated with use

rights, and a heavy reliance on local expertise.7 They use these
principles to criticize the regulatory takings cases and scholarship' that
have called zoning into question in recent years. The legal principles
that make zoning run, they claim, represent a "strong element of

2. See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 1, at 1010.
3. See Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past, Present,
and Future, 54 Aib. L. Rev. 189, 210 (1990).
4. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Dolan v. Tigard, 512
U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
5. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002); Eric R. Claeys, Takings and Private Property on the Rehnquist Court, 99 Nw.
U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2004).
6. Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan Wolf, Euclid Lives: The Survival of
ProgressiveJurisprudence,115 Harv. L. Rev. 2158 (2002).
7. See id. at 2174-97. Haar and Wolf also discuss a fifth principle that federal
courts ought to promote federalism values by deferring to state and local land-use
regulations in takings challenges. See id. at 2191-94. Stewart Sterk has made the
same argument in a full-length article in Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension
of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 Yale L.J. (forthcoming 2004). This Essay
does not discuss federalism. Federalism issues affect how federal courts should
review constitutional challenges to zoning regulations, but not to how zoning ought to
be organized in the first instance.
8. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent
Domain (1985); Bernard H. Siegan, Land Use Without Zoning (1972); Bernard H.
Siegan, Property and Freedom: The Constitution, the Courts, and Land-Use
Regulation (1997); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking
Clause Is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1630 (1988).

2004]

EUCLID LIVES?

American legal thought," which deserves to be "rediscovered and
modified for deployment in the current debate over the nature and
extent of private property rights."9
Haar and Wolf should be commended for encouraging a scholarly
discussion about Euclid and land-use regulation. I agree with them
that the Rehnquist Court's forays into regulatory takings law have
been indefensible, though I am sure we disagree on the reasons why.' °
Therefore, in this Essay, I focus on what I regard to be the most
original and valuable contribution of their essay-their insights about
the Progressive roots of zoning.
Zoning and Euclid are both products of the Progressive Era. The
tenets of land-use regulation that Haar and Wolf praise are all
hallmarks of the Progressive ideas that influenced American politics
and the realist ideas that influenced American law in the first third of
the twentieth century. Haar and Wolf recognize as much by calling
these tenets by the general name "Progressive jurisprudence."" They
enthusiastically praise Progressive jurisprudence: They even go so far
as to contend that it deserves to be considered with law and
economics, critical legal studies, and the other schools of legal thought
that have prevailed in the legal academy over the last several
decades. 2
This last claim is ambitious, and it deserves to be judged by
standards as severe as the ambition is high. Haar and Wolf are surely
right that Progressive ideas are central to zoning, and that a
reexamination of these ideas is long overdue. However, as I will
demonstrate in this Essay, I suspect that "Progressive jurisprudence,"
to use Haar and Wolf's term, is more problematic than they assume.
This deficiency is understandable, for in zoning as elsewhere it is
notoriously difficult to pin down what it means for law or legislation
to be "Progressive." Haar and Wolf confirm as much when they
speak of Progressivism as faith in the "positive potential of
government," as a principle that "legislative and administrative efforts
often result in social and economic progress for the commonweal."' 3
Such statements make zoning sound as if it is all upside and no
downside, as if zoning can provide all things to all communities
without tying itself to any one vision of the common good. As a
result, there are good reasons to wonder whether Progressive

9. Haar & Wolf, supra note 6, at 2160.
10. See Claeys, supra note 5. Haar and Wolf would probably agree with Stewart
Sterk's response to that article. See Stewart E. Sterk, The Inevitable Failure of
Nuisance-Based Theories of the Takings Clause: A Reply to Professor Claeys, 99 Nw.
U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2004).
11. Haar & Wolf, supra note 6, at 2160.
12. See id.
13. Id. at 2197.
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jurisprudence is as versatile as Haar and Wolf assume it is, and
whether it is as robust a school of legal thought as they claim it is.
My answers are no, and no. This Essay argues that Progressive
jurisprudence is not a self-standing legal theory; rather, it is better
understood as a practical application of a more comprehensive
Progressive theory of politics. In this Essay, I will continue to use the
phrase "Progressive jurisprudence," as Haar and Wolf do, to refer to
the general legal principles that unify and guide the law of zoning:
changing circumstances, strong and diverse conceptions of the public
interest, fluid property rights, and expertise. If one takes these
principles at face value, zoning seems relatively apolitical. It seems to
apply planning, expertise, and other value-neutral tools of social
control to resolve potential land-use conflicts before they happen.
But the normative claims that justify Progressive jurisprudence are
not very well articulated. They do not explain zoning's basic
orientation, and they cannot answer the hard theoretical questions a
theory of law and politics must answer if it is going to earn a place at
the table with the legal theories that prevail now.
To understand zoning's tendencies, one needs to understand them
as an application of what this Essay calls "Progressive political
theory." The Essay recovers, studies, and interprets materials long
overlooked by the land-use community: the speeches and writing of
zoning advocates in the 1910s and 1920s. These materials include
books and pamphlets by leading urban and land-use reformers, the
first wave of legal treatises written on zoning in the 1920s, and the
published speeches and reports from the National Conference on City
Planning, an annual conference conducted in the 1910s and 1920s by
the leading practitioners, academics, and public officials who made up
the first generation of "experts" in land-use planning and regulation.14
These materials are extremely insightful because they articulate more
clearly than contemporary law the "public interest" justifications for
contemporary Euclidean zoning. Zoning, like any other system of
public-law regulation, depends on a comprehensive opinion
explaining why it advances the "public interest." One may call such
an opinion an ideology, a set of regime principles, 5 an institutional
purpose, 6 or something else, but zoning clearly relies on some set of
shared beliefs explaining how people behave in relation to claims
about the common good, what specific vision of the common good will
make them happy, and how zoning promotes it. This Essay calls that

14. See infra Part II.
15. See Bruce Ackerman, We The People: Foundations 59 (1991).
16. See Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek, Beyond the Iconography of Order:
Notes for a "New Institutionalism," in The Dynamics of American Politics:
Approaches and Interpretations 311, 326 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Calvin Jillson eds.,
1994).
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amalgamated theory of law and politics by the name "Progressive
political theory."
As they apply to zoning, the main features of Progressive political
theory run as follows. First, in the Progressive understanding, "the
general welfare" tends to elevate what the Progressives called
"organic" goods and what we would now call collective,
communitarian goods. It elevates order, community, homogeneity,
financial security, and beauty, and subordinates more self-centered
goods like freedom and individual expression in the use of land.
Second, and conversely, Progressive theory reshapes how law and
regulation conceive of property. Property is directed away from
allocating to each owner a zone of noninterference within which to
use her own property actively for her own peculiar purposes; instead,
owners are transformed into stakeholders in the common civic,
aesthetic, and property-value interests that unify everyone in the
locality. Third, zoning expects that local majorities should be given
free rein to express their own communal visions of community,
security, and aesthetics. Last, zoning expects that these majoritydriven community visions can be implemented by local planning
experts, who bring them to life by promulgating a legislative pattern
of use districts, by enforcing the districts, and by granting exceptions
to them.
The interpretation of zoning presented here deserves study for a
simple reason: It calls into question whether conventional land-use
scholars can explain why zoning matters and why it is a good legal
institution. By "conventional land-use scholars," I mean to exclude
scholars who think of themselves first as specialists in law and
economics, critical legal studies, or some other theory for analyzing
law and politics, and then apply the lessons of their interdisciplinary
specialty to land-use regulation. I mean instead to refer to the
scholars, such as Haar and Wolf, who immerse themselves in the
administrative law and judicial review of zoning, who write the best
practical casebooks and treatises on land-use regulation, and do the
synthetic work to restate the law that must be organized and answer
the questions that must be settled for any specific field of regulation to
function as an self-standing specialty. The work and scholarship of
conventional land-use scholars, so defined, depend heavily on the
tenets of Haar and Wolf's Progressive jurisprudence, but those tenets
are surprisingly questionable.
As will become clear, I have my doubts about zoning, and
accordingly I make no claim to speak for the scholars for whom I am
raising questions. But the problems with Progressive jurisprudence
are serious. At a minimum, those problems dampen Haar and Wolf's
hopes. Progressive jurisprudence does not deserve a seat at the table
with law and economics and other similarly influential theories of law
and politics. In addition, these problems ought to force conventional
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Progressive
land-use scholars to consider an awkward choice.
jurisprudence's tenets do not stand on their own. They do make
perfect sense as applications of what was formerly known as
Progressive political theory, and what now thrives as communitarian
political theory, but most conventional land-use scholars do not
understand zoning law in these more political terms. If such scholars
prefer not to embrace Progressive political theory, then zoning is
bound to remain on uneasy theoretical foundations. If they prefer to
embrace the more political commitments of Progressivism, they had
better be prepared to accept the bitter with the sweet.
I. THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF EUCLIDEAN ZONING

A. Exclusion Versus Governance
To appreciate zoning's character, let us classify it in a taxonomy of
different approaches to property regulation. The most revealing
taxonomy is Henry Smith's distinction between "exclusion" regimes
and "governance" regimes. According to Smith, when the law relies
on an "exclusion" regime, it "uses a rough informational variable or
signal-such as entry-to define the right, and thus bunches together
a range of uses that juries, judges and other officials need never
measure directly."' 7 Exclusion thus "grants owners a gatekeeper right
that protects the owners' interest in a wide and indefinite class of uses
without the need ever to delineate-perhaps even to identify-those
uses at all."18 By contrast, at the other conceptual extreme lies a pure
"governance" regime, which aims to "implement a list of use rights
holding between all potential pairwise combinations of persons with
respect to any... conceivable activity that has any impact on
anyone."' 9
One must appreciate that distinction between exclusion and
governance to appreciate the full force of Haar and Wolf's claims
about Progressive jurisprudence. The legal history matters here, and
as a matter of history, zoning replaced an "exclusion"-based regime of
land-use regulation with a "governance"-based regime. Separately,
when Haar and Wolf tout zoning's Progressive features, they do so
because they like zoning's governance-based features -particularly in
contrast to the "exclusion"-based approaches reflected in recent

17. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 Va.
L. Rev. 965, 972 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules]; see also
Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating
PropertyRights, 31 J. Legal Stud. 453, 453-87 (2002).
18. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules, supra note 17, at 973.
19. Id. at 972-73 (discussing governance and governance's definition).
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regulatory-takings cases by the Supreme Court, and in regulatorytakings scholarship by Richard Epstein and other similar scholars.2 °
B. Nineteenth-Century Land-Use Regulation
From what we know about nineteenth-century land-use regulation,
it tended toward the "exclusion" side of the continuum. We do not
know enough about the legislative regulation from this era, but from
the evidence available it seems that cities regulated land in ways that
were much more narrowly targeted than modern zoning.
Municipalities regulated the height and composition of buildings.
They abated moral nuisances and gunpowder houses, slaughterhouses,
and other sources of serious pollution. When certain neighborhoods
"tipped" toward industrial, residential, or other uses, a city might
define the boundaries of the ready-made "locality" and exclude nonuses. Otherwise, however, they left land-use decisions to
conforming
21
owners.
That pattern of regulation was at least one pattern in land-use
legislation, but it was also influential because it broadly tracked ideas
about property regulation that prevailed in nineteenth-century
constitutional law. In Buchanan v. Warley, a 1917 case invalidating a
race-based zoning scheme enacted in Louisville, Kentucky, the U.S.
Supreme Court described the broad outlines of police power land-use
regulation as follows:
Harmful occupations may be controlled and regulated. Legitimate
business may also be regulated in the interest of the public. Certain
uses of property may be confined to portions of the municipality
of the impairment of the
other than the resident district.... because
22
health and comfort of the occupants.
By modern standards, these outlines made it difficult or impossible
to use zoning for many important and routine public purposes. Judge
D.C. Westenhaver gave a sense of what was left out when he declared
20. See supra notes 5 and 8.
21. The account presented in the text is provisional because we still know
comparatively little about some forms of nineteenth-century American land-use
regulation, especially municipal police power regulations, and because much of the
evidence that we do have has been interpreted in sharply conflicting ways. However,
the account presented in the text accords with the sketch of nineteenth-century landuse regulation portrayed in William J. Novak, The People's Welfare: Law &
Regulation in Nineteenth-CenturyAmerica 51-82, 149-90 (1996), and also the sketch of
nineteenth-century moral theory portrayed in Mark Warren Bailey, Guardiansof the
Moral Order: The Legal Philosophy of the Supreme Court, 1860-1910 (2004). The
reader should note, however, that other scholars read the record to suggest that
colonial and early American cities regulated land much more closely, along the lines
of medieval towns. See, e.g., John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and
the OriginalMeaning of the Takings Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1099 (2000).
22. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1917).
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unconstitutional the zoning ordinance of Euclid, Ohio in Ambler
Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, the trial court prelude to the subject of
Haar and Wolf's paean.23 While zoning might be used to set uniform
aesthetic standards throughout a town, such standards did not count
as property "regulations" because they extinguished valuable use and
development rights. That is not to say that cities could not impose
aesthetic requirements. But it did mean they needed to condemn the
possessory interests and servitudes they were taking from owners, pay
the owners just compensation in an eminent domain proceeding and,
most likely, finance the eminent domain by imposing special
assessments on the neighbors benefiting the most.24 Zoning could not
be used to segregate stand-alone single-family houses from row
houses, and it probably could not have been used to segregate any
form of housing from apartments absent a showing that the
apartments were unusually noisy."
Zoning could not be used to
restrain the course of development of undeveloped property, at least
not without making sure that the restraints provided owners a
"reciprocity of advantage," by making the development rights they
retained more valuable than the development rights they lost. 6
The conception of the police powers in Euclid was extremely
narrow and decentralized in contrast to zoning. Within Henry Smith's
dichotomy, the concept of regulation was narrow because it followed
from an "exclusion"-based conception of property. Owners were
presumed to deserve the greatest range of freedom available to use
their properties for their own purposes. The law protected owners
from pollution, vibrations, and other discrete and physical invasions of
their use rights. That protection secured to owners a right to control
the active use and development of their lots for their own purposes.
At the same time, it generally refrained from enforcing uniformity
requirements or pursuing aesthetic goals. Owners had to give up any
right to complain about disuniformity or eyesores as the price for
preserving the right to decide for themselves how to use their lots.
Both sides of this tradeoff followed from a conception of freedom
that followed from the natural-law/natural-rights ideas evident in the
23. 297 F. 307 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev'd, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
24. See id. at 316; see also id. at 316-17 (citing state court decisions).
25. See id. at 314 (holding that any "law or ordinance passed under the guise of
the police power which invades private property as above defined can be sustained
only when it has a real and substantial relation to the maintenance and preservation
of the public peace, public order, public morals, or public safety"); id. at 316
(criticizing the ordinance because its "purpose... is really to regulate the mode of
living of persons who may hereafter inhabit it").
26. Id. at 315-16.
For more extensive support of this interpretation of
Westenhaver's opinion, see Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural
Property Rights, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1549, 1628-33 (2003). See also Seymour 1. Toll,
Zoned American 213-27 (1969).
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Declaration of Independence and other Founding Era public
documents. The "exclusion"-based conception of property followed
from a conception of freedom centered in the individual. "Property"
extended to every owner a presumptive right to decide, free from
outside interference, how he should use his own labor and possessions
for his own chosen ends. This presumption held unless the state or a
neighbor could specifically show that an owner's land use diminished
and therefore injured the equal zone of noninterference to which each
Buchanan v. Warley described this
neighbor was entitled.
presumptive zone of freedom as "the free use, enjoyment, and
disposal of a person's acquisitions without control or diminution save
by the law of the land."2 7 This conception of freedom followed from
conceptions of equal and natural rights out of Founding Era socialcompact theory. In Euclid, Judge Westenhaver cited and applied
provisions of the Ohio Constitution, declaring that "[a]ll men ...have
certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property," and that "[p]rivate property shall ever be held inviolate."28
As it applies to property, the natural law prescribes, and the social
compact protects, "property" in a freedom to be left alone, to apply
one's own peculiar passions and talents to use one's own property for
one's own advancement. 9
C. Euclidean Zoning
Euclidean zoning replaced this "exclusion"-based regime with a
"governance "-based regime.
Euclidean zoning institutes a
centralized, command-and-control style of land-use regulation. It
operates on the principle, "a place for everything, and everything in its
The zoning process enables local majorities to set the
place."
"governance" standards-the goals that use districts will promote. To
draw up and enforce these districts, Euclidean zoning relies heavily on
land-use experts. Taken together, these features work to encourage
uniformity and majority rule over the disorder created by diverse
individual choices.
One can appreciate the distinctive features of Euclidean zoning
simply by comparing the outlines of the nineteenth-century system to
the zoning scheme the Supreme Court upheld in its 1926 zoning
decision Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,3 and to the Standard
State Zoning Enabling Act ("Standard Enabling Act"), which the
U.S. Department of Commerce published in 1926 with substantial

27.
28.
29.
30.

Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 74.
Euclid, 297 F. at 310 (quoting Ohio Const. art. I, §§ 1, 19).
See Claeys, supra note 26, at 1568-69, 1609-12.
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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input from Progressive land-use planners. 3' Above all else, Euclidean
zoning centralizes community land use. The Standard Enabling Act
requires development to be coordinated in "accordance with a
Most municipalities do not draft a
comprehensive plan."3 2
"comprehensive plan" before they establish their zoning districts, but
they still preapprove major development decisions through a
centralized review process.33
As the Supreme Court described
Euclid's zoning scheme, it was a "comprehensive zoning plan for
regulating and restricting the location of trades, industries, apartment
houses, two-family houses, single-family houses, etc., the lot area to be
built upon, the size and height of buildings, etc."34
The Euclidean zoning plan expanded the range of public interests
that could legally justify a local scheme of land-use regulation.
Zoning expanded the conception of the "public interest" or "general
welfare" protected by the police powers. Some of the factors
considered in the comprehensive city plan closely tracked the
conceptions of individual rights and general welfare that prevailed in
the nineteenth century. These factors included, for instance, how "to35
lessen congestion in the streets," and "to secure safety from fire.
But the plans were also required to incorporate many other factors
that were not part of the normal nineteenth-century conception of the
public interest. Comprehensive plans had to consider how "to provide
adequate light" and "to avoid undue concentration of population."36
Most far-reaching, comprehensive plans needed to consider how
zoning would affect property values by "conserving the value of
buildings," and whether zoning would promote aesthetic and
community-character concerns by "encouraging the most appropriate
use of land throughout [the] municipality."37
Progressive zoning also gave local land-use planners a larger
The Standard Enabling Act
complement of regulatory tools.
recognized some regulatory powers that were unexceptional on the
earlier view, like the power to regulate the size and composition of
buildings." It also vested in municipalities new powers, including the

31. Dep't of Commerce Advisory Comm. on Zoning, A Standard State Zoning
Enabling Act: Under Which Municipalities May Adopt Zoning Regulations (1926)
[hereinafter Standard Enabling Act].
32. Id. § 3.
33. Cf Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 Harv. L.
Rev. 1154 (1955) (studying how courts do and should enforce the "in accordance with
a comprehensive plan" requirement when a city does not promulgate a plan before
promulgating zones).
34. Euclid,272 U.S. at 379-80.
35. Standard Enabling Act, supra note 31, § 3.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. § 1.
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powers to regulate the percentage of a lot that could be developed,
minimum open space requirements, and population-density levels.3 9
The most powerful new tools, however, were the use districts-the
The Standard Enabling Act took to a new level what
zones."
Buchanan had recognized as the power to confine certain uses of
property to neighborhoods "other than the resident district."4
Section 2 recognized a power to "divide the municipality into districts
of such number, shape, and area as may be deemed best suited to
carry out the purposes of this act. '412 In practice under the Standard
Enabling Act, use districts were cumulative so that owners could
pursue more delicate land uses in districts reserved for more industrial
uses; more recently, zoning ordinances have tended to make use
districts exclusive, allowing only the uses specified for the zone.43
All of these changes traced a shift from an "exclusion"-based
conception of property to a "govemance"-based conception. Before
zoning, most land uses were presumed legitimate, unless specifically
shown to be dangerous or unsuitable to the neighborhood.
Afterward, most land uses were presumed illegitimate unless they
conformed to the master plan's specifications for the local use district.
Euclidean zoning thus transformed the orientation of property
rights. It transformed what used to be a negative liberty into a
positive entitlement. Once Euclidean zoning had taken over, each
zoned lot came with a security-a legal guarantee that neighbors
would use their lots consistently with tastes, standards and economic
goals set by the control group in the local community. In the process,
Euclidean zoning also shifted a great deal of control over land-use
regulations from individual owners to local majorities and expert landuse planners. Each local owner loses substantial freedom to control
the use of his own parcel of land, but gains the opportunity to vote on
how his neighbors ought to use their properties. In turn, the
majorities pass on some of their newfound power to their
administrative delegates-local land-use planners-who implement
the majorities' will in two stages. Zoning commissions supervise and
enforce the zones; boards of adjustment or similar entities consider
requests for special exceptions, variances, and other deviations from
the zones. 44

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id. § 2.
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 75 (1917).
Standard Enabling Act, supra note 31, § 2.
See Mandelker, supra note 1, § 1.04.
Id.§6.
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II. THE PROGRESSIVES' CASE FOR ZONING

A. Progress
The obvious question to ask is whether zoning's supporters justified
this new approach by appealing to any overarching political theory
comparable to the natural law ideas that informed nineteenth-century
land-use law. As it turns out, they did. These features of zoning are
all hallmarks of Progressive political theory: the centralization of
land-use planning, the transformation of property rights to
accommodate that centralization, and the reliance on majority rule in
the broad picture and on experts in the details.45 To show the
connection, this part studies the books and pamphlets written to
persuade cities to adopt zoning, the legal treatises written after zoning
codes survived constitutional challenges in the courts, and many
speeches, colloquies, and papers by urban planners involved in the
annual National Conference on City Planning, the trade guild for
professional zoning advocates.
Before proceeding it is important to consider two possible
objections to interpreting these materials. One objection, stated by
William Fischel, holds that Progressive reformers, planners, and
lawyers were not as crucial to the history of zoning as popular
majorities and home developers. 6 My purpose here, however, is not
to argue about which political constituency was most influential in
campaigning for zoning. Even if majorities and developers exerted
the political muscle, Progressive planners and lawyers still wrote the
blueprints for zoning laws and stepped in as the first zoning
administrators. The latter thus supplied the theory of the "public
interest" that put a public face on the homeowners' and developers'
private demands. Another obvious objection is that these reformers,
lawyers, and planners did not speak with the same voice or subscribe
to any one overarching set of political assumptions. It is true that
most of these activists did not connect their specific and practical
arguments for zoning to any comprehensive and fully-articulated
political theory. All the same, that fact does not prove much. Politics
would become extremely tendentious if partisans needed to defend
every step of their argument by citing the thought of some leading
public intellectual.
Zoning's advocates did share some political
consensus covering the topics mentioned above. They presupposed a

45. To appreciate the similarities, compare the portrait of Progressive
administrative theory in Eric R. Claeys, ProgressivePolitical Theory and Separation
of Powers on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, Const. Comm. (forthcoming 2005)
(manuscript on file with author) with the classic defense of New Deal administrative
government, in James M. Landis, The Administrative Process (1938).
46. See William A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for Its
Exclusionary Effects, 41 Urb. Stud. 317, 319 (2004).
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common understanding as to how academic and professional sciences
could improve real life practice in land use. As a result, it is revealing
to interpret the writings of early land-use advocates on the hypothesis
that they were applying general principles of a single political theory
to land-use practice. Like any other, this interpretation must be
judged by whether it plausibly makes sense of the sources and
explains important features of zoning.
To restate several of the leading themes of Progressive political
theory, this part will rely on the later writings of Woodrow Wilson.
Before Wilson was President of the United States, he was a respected
professor of political science and a leading public intellectual. The
works he wrote while contemplating his candidacy for the President,
The New Freedom47 and Constitutional Government in the United
States,4 8 are extremely informative because they distill several decades
of Progressive academic thought into two manageable books. As
Wilson defined progress, it was a faith in the future: "The modern
idea is to leave the past and press onward to something new. ' 49 The
Progressive future unfolded through a process of adaptation. "The
laws of this country have not kept up with the change of economic
circumstances in this country," Wilson asserted, "they have not kept
up with the change of political circumstances; and therefore we are
not even where we were when we started."5 This adaptation is not
something the people enter into voluntarily; it is a fundamental
political reality. "I do not say we may or may not," Wilson stated, "I
say we must; there is no choice. If your laws do not fit your facts, the
facts are not injured, the law is damaged; because the law.., is the
expression of the facts in legal relationships."'"
Progressive adaptation in politics thus follows Darwin's principles
of evolution in biology, with one important difference: the unit of
study in political science is not the single human, but a human society.
Like a Darwinian species, society is in a constant state of evolutionconstant "development and accommodation to environment" -and
evolution always proceeds onward and forward.5"
Government,
Wilson explained, falls "under the theory of organic life"; it is
"modified by its environment, necessitated by its tasks, shaped to its
functions by the sheer pressure of life."5 3 A government, however,
cannot adapt effectively unless its citizens constitute a well-formed
people. A people is well formed if its leading opinions are rational, if
47. Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom: A Call for the Emancipation of the
Generous Energies of a People (1913).
48. Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States (1911).
49. Wilson, supra note 47, at 42.
50. Id. at 33.
51. Id. at 35.
52. Id. at 45.
53. Wilson, supra note 48, at 56.
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they are shaped not in haphazard fashion but with intelligent
planning, by "a quick concert of thought, uttered by those who know
how to guide both counsel and action."54 Such a people have mastered
their selfish tendencies and redirected their energies toward the
common good, like the readers of The New Freedom, which Wilson
dedicated "to every man or woman who may derive from it... the
impulse of unselfish public service."55
B. Changed Circumstances
These concepts of progress, adaptation, and community inspired the
Progressives to critique a wide range of American institutions,
including the law of land use. That critique started with the notion of
The Progressives held that new times
changed circumstances.
required a new set of land-use laws. American city life and living
patterns had changed drastically between the end of the eighteenth
century and the beginning of the twentieth. Lawyers who subscribed
to the earlier natural-law/natural-rights view would readily agree that
land-use law needed to change with the times, but only to regulate
new conditions to conform to permanent principles. 6 Progressive
land-use reformers, however, concluded that new times required not
only new laws but also new principles.
The new times were ushered in by Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., an
architect, a Harvard professor and the first president of the National
Conference on City Planning. Olmsted captured the new point of
view when he described the modern city as a "live, productive
organism.., in a constant state of change and growth."57 "Just as new
generations replace the old with individuals who differ from their
predecessors to some extent in body and in mind," Olmsted reasoned,
"so in such a city old buildings, old streets, old institutions must give
way, more slowly but no less certainly, to new and different
generations."5 8
As in many other areas of reform, the most immediate agent of
progress in land-use reform was the Industrial Revolution, which
caused unforeseen and unprecedented economic problems. Olmsted
identified "the need for additional equipment" - buildings and

54. Id. at 21.
55. Wilson, supra note 47, at v. I have further explicated the themes in this
section elsewhere. See Eric R. Claeys, Zoning and ProgressivePoliticalTheory, in The
Progressive Revolution in Politics and Political Science: Regime Change in America
(Ken Masugi & John Marini eds., forthcoming 2005).
56. See Claeys, supra note 26, at 1574-76.
57. Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., Reply in Behalf of the City Planning Conference,
in Proceedings of the Third National Conference on City Planning 5 (1911)
[hereinafter Third Conference Proceedings].
58. Id. at 10.
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housing-the production of which was stimulated "indirectly and
often so tardily as to cause serious hardship and economic loss." 59 For
engineer and Planning Conference Vice Chairman Nelson Lewis, the
proper response was to identify "[t]he economic considerations which
should control city planning... namely, adaptation to probable or
possible increase in demand and capacity to supply that demand. 6 °
But many Progressives rejected Lewis's assumption that economic
forces were the most powerful agents of progress. These reformers
thought that these economic factors merely reflected deeper
psychological, social, and political changes. Sharp economic growth,
coupled with the closing of the American frontier, worked a profound
The country
change in the American collective consciousness.
embraced a new psychology of scarcity. As historian Christine Boyer
explains this change, the demise of the frontier swept in "the concept
of limit and the change of sympathies it entailed. When Americans
reached the end of westward expansion and were finally forced to turn
inward upon themselves, it was with hostility and embarrassment that
they observed their disfigured and inhumane cities."6 1
The same historical forces also created demand for a new form of
Progressive housing reformer Carol
municipality, the "suburb."
Aronovici expected that "Utopia[] [could be] realized in the
suburbs."62 Suburbs represented the next wave of progress as soon as
the cities declined. Suburbs promised to prevent many of the
atomizing tendencies of industrialization. As social reformer Annie
Diggs explained, workers were entitled to "a righteous share of the
benefits of civilization they help[ed] to create."6 3 The way to do so
was to give each worker a quarter acre and a lawn to return to at the
end of the working day in the city factory. "The demoralizations and
deprivations consequent on congested centers of population," warned
Diggs, "have at length taught the Garden City economist the essential
sin of divorcing the children of men from their Mother Earth."' And
in return, robust suburbs would also redound to the benefit of the
cities. Homeowners habituated to enjoy the benefits of garden living
would, in Christine Boyer's description, "no more tolerate the slum

59. Id. at 5-6.
60. Nelson P. Lewis, The City Plan Defined by a Municipal Engineer, in
Proceedings of the Seventh National Conference on City Planning 3 (1915)
[hereinafter Seventh Conference Proceedings].
61. M. Christine Boyer, Dreaming the Rational City: The Myth of American City
Planning 4 (1983).
62. Carol Aronovici, Suburban Development, 51 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc.
Sci. 234, 238 (1914).
63. Annie L. Diggs, The Garden City Movement, 28 Arena 626, 628 (1902).
64. Id. at 631-32.
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and the tenement than they would the plagues that were prevalent a
generation ago.""
The Progressives were both concerned and optimistic about the
prospects of reforming land-use planning in their day. They were
concerned because they thought United States cities were lagging
behind the finest European cites like Paris and especially the bestplanned German cities, which had all embraced zoning.' Even so, the
Progressives were optimistic because they expected to surpass their
French and German role models. European planners needed to
reckon with centuries of archaic traditions; the Progressives were in
the fortunate position of legislating on what they regarded as a blank
slate. As Chicago reformer Walter Moody proclaimed, "We of
America, starting in a new country, acting without restraint of custom
or ancient law, see our own remarkable opportunities in city building,
and, it may be generally stated, are working for harmony and beauty
in the building of our cities."67
C. The Rise of the General Welfare
Thus, the Progressives needed to ask how best to exploit both the
opportunity and the challenge that the forces of progress had thrust
upon them. They had a wide range of proposals, including city cleanup, property-value stabilization, beautification, and above all, urban
planning. To establish each of these proposals in practice, they
needed to redefine what counted as a legally cognizable "general
welfare." American constitutional law recognized that states and
localities enjoyed an inherent police power to legislate for the public
health, safety, and morals and what Lawrence Veiller, Secretary of the
National Housing Association, called "that novel, broad and sweeping
ground, 'the general welfare."'"
Veiller read turn of the century
precedents on the meaning of this phrase to "open[] a door a crack,

65. Boyer, supra note 61, at 42; see also Frank T. Carlton, Urban and Rural Life,
Popular Sci. Monthly, March 1906, at 255. See generally Boyer, supra note 61, at 4043.
66. See, e.g., Walter D. Moody, Wacker's Manual of the Plan of Chicago 27-38 (3d
ed. 1920); Edward M. Bassett, A Survey of the Legal Status of a Specific City in
Relation to City Planning, in Proceedings of the Fifth National Conference on City
Planning 46, 58-59 (1918) [hereinafter Fifth Conference Proceedings]; Frederick C.
Howe, The Municipal Real Estate Policies of German Cities, in Third Conference
Proceedings, supra note 57, at 14; Frank B. Williams, Some Aspects of City Planning
Administration in Europe, in Seventh Conference Proceedings, supra note 60, at 144,
147-54.
67. Moody, supra note 66, at 39. For development of the themes in this section,
see Claeys, supra note 55.
68. Lawrence Veiller, Districting by Muncipal Regulation, in Proceedings of the
Eighth National Conference on City Planning 147, 153 (1916).
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which may be opened very wide. How wide it may be opened few of
us can tell."69
The Progressives understood the general welfare in strongly
communitarian terms. They hoped to instill Americans with a sense
of local community as an antidote against the destructive and
atomizing tendencies of the Industrial Revolution. The Industrial
Revolution upset city life by making cities bigger, dirtier, more
unwieldy, and more chaotic than they had ever been before. It upset
the life of the working man by subordinating him into a huge
industrial organization and by severing the connection that used to
exist between his work and home.7" The Progressives tried to correct
these problems at both the national and the local levels. At the
national level, Progressives like Woodrow Wilson and Herbert Croly
expected the Constitution, and especially the Commerce Clause, to
hasten the formation of a general American will strong enough to give
Congress a basis to respond to industrial dislocation.71 Paradoxically,
however, this national project could not succeed without more
energetic local government. As Wilson explained:
[M]orals enforced by the judgment and choices of the central
authority at Washington, do not and cannot create vital habits or
methods of life unless sustained by local opinion and purpose,....
and only communities capable of taking care of themselves will,
constitute a nation capable of vital action and
taken together,
72
control.
The early social reform land-use literature is riddled with Wilson's
idea of formation. Walter Moody claimed that national patriotism
was getting "a companion sentiment-devotion," and "patriotism, an
outgrowth of modern conditions of life, [which] takes the form
generally of a high and controlling pride in one's native city, or in the
city in which one abides and has adopted as his home. '73 James
Metzenbaum regarded the single-family home as "[tihe bulwark and
the stamina of this country,... one of the important factors in the
sustaining of the American people and American ideals. '74 Many
Progressives were uneasy with the commercialism of modern life and
nostalgic for the intense patriotism of antiquity. Moody, for one,
hoped that

69. Id.
70. See Boyer, supra note 61, at 9-56; Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform
215-27 (1955).
71. See Eric R. Claeys, The Living Commerce Clause: Federalism in Progressive
Political Theory and the Commerce Clause After Lopez and Morrison, 11 Wm. &
Mary Bill Rts. J. 403,416-18 (2002).
72. Wilson, supra note 48, at 195.
73. Moody, supra note 66, at v.
74. James Metzenbaum, The Law of Zoning 127 (1930).
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[situdents of modern history, seeking to classify or set apart this
devotion to the city by its people, and love of a city by its children,
will find the feeling not only a new, unique and valuable tendency of
the times, but also a revival, under modern conditions, of a
patriotism as old as civilization itself.75
These conceptions of patriotism and ideals gave Progressive
legislation a communitarian spirit. Moody, Metzenbaum and Wilson
were voicing themes that trace back to Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
Rousseau's social contract promised to solve what he diagnosed as the
fundamental problem in the human condition: that man is so free that
he knows little better than to enslave himself out of fear of his
freedom.76 The social contract promised to solve this problem
because "the total alienation of each associate, together with all his
rights, to the whole community" would free him to partake in the
community's "unity, its common identity, its life, and its will."77 The
Progressives' concept of community is quite similar, because many
American Progressives received their educations at German
universities influenced by Georg W.F. Hegel's theories of history and
the state, which in turn were influenced by Rousseau's thought.78 The
historical march of progress steered man toward the social contract;
Progressive communities and laws finished the job.
The Progressives had at least four ways to institute the strong local
communities of which they were so enamored. First, cities needed to
control overcrowding. New York reformer Benjamin Marsh saw
density controls as a way to prevent high mortality rates and physical
deterioration.79
Chicago reformer George Hooker worried that
housing for "the masses of the people are chiefly characterized by
disorder," caused by "the activity of certain great special interests,"
and "tendencies more or less personal to the people themselves."8 In
some cases, controlling overcrowding was a polite way of excluding
"undesirable" residents like new immigrants and members of different
81
races.

75. Moody, supra note 66, at vi.
76. See Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract,in The Social Contract and
the Discourses 179, 181-82 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1993).
77. Id. at 191-92.
78. See Thomas H. Logan, The Americanization of German Zoning, Am.
Institution Plan. J., Oct. 1976, at 377; Yale Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable
Legacy of Euclid, in Zoning and the American Dream: Promises Still to Keep 101,
103-05 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989).
79. See Benjamin Clarke Marsh, An Introduction to City Planning: Democracy's
Challenge to the American City 7-10 (1909).
80. George E. Hooker, Congestion and Its Causes in Chicago, in Proceedings of
the Second National Conference on City Planning and the Problems of Congestion
42, 49 (1912).
81. See Bruno Lasker, The Atlanta Zoning Plan, 48 Survey 114, 114-15 (1922)
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Second, cities and suburbs alike were expected to zone to make
themselves more presentable and more beautiful. John Nolen
disparaged the tendency in nineteenth-century law to keep land-use
regulation out of aesthetic disputes. "Nothing can be valid," he said
of most American cities, "that has this degree of sordid and selfsatisfied ugliness. We were meant to live in beauty, to cherish it and
to create it, and a civilization that functions in the hideous and
uncouth is a civilization of the wrong shape. 82 Thus, when Daniel
Burnham staged the 1893 World's Fair in Chicago to show off the
city's architecture, he sparked a "City Beautiful" movement seeking
to adorn America's great cities with neoclassical monuments.83 While
the cities promised grandeur, the suburbs beckoned with pastoral,
idyllic tranquility. Englishman Ebenezer Howard encouraged the
move to the suburbs in his 1902 book Garden Cities of To-morrow,
which promised to remedy London's overcrowding by providing
workers with wholesome homes outside city limits.' Frederick Law
Olmsted, Sr., a renowned architect and city designer, embraced the
suburban vision for America. "[T]he demands of suburban life"
would "advance upon" the refinement "characteristic of town life"
because it would secure "the peculiar advantage of the country, such
as purity of air, umbrageousness, facilities for quiet out-of-door
recreation and distance from the jar, noise, confusion, and bustle of
commercial thoroughfares."85
Third, cities and especially suburbs were expected to use regulatory
powers to stabilize the price of home values. It might seem strange to
call a suburbanite "communitarian" for wanting to exclude new
development to prop up the price of his home. Nevertheless, that is
how Charles Cheney, a California planner, saw it. Cheney insisted
that it is the object of zoning to remove "uncertainty from real estate
while, stabilizing property values."86 Robert Whitten, a nationallyknown academic influential in New York City and Cleveland zoning

(warning of racial exclusion); cf. Metzenbaum, supra note 74, at 128 (arguing that
zoning "prevent[s] 'slums' and congested living quarters, which develop into blighted
territory"). See generally Constance Perin, Everything in Its Place: Social Order and
Land Use in America (1977); Rabin, supra note 78.
82. John Nolen, The Place of the Beautiful in the City Plan, Some Everyday
Examples, in Proceedings of the Fourteenth National Conference on City Planning
133, 134 (1922).
83. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 1, at 954-55.
84. Ebenezer Howard, Garden Cities of To-morrow (F.J. Osborn ed., 1965).
85. Frederick Law Olmsted, Riverside Illinois: A Planned Community Near
Chicago, in Civilizing American Cities: A Selection of Frederick Law Olmsted's
Writings on City Landscapes 292, 295 (S.B. Sutton ed., 1971). See generally Carlton,
supra note 65.
86. Charles H. Cheney, Zoning in Practice, in Proceedings of the Eleventh
National Conference on City Planning 162, 162 (1920).
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efforts, insisted that the case for stabilization was not economic but
moral.
Even though "haphazard development has resulted in
enormous waste and destruction of property values," he argued, the
waste "is not nearly as important as the social and civic loss."
From a social and civic point of view, there is nothing more
important than the maintenance of the morale of the neighborhood.
As soon as the confidence of the home owner in the maintenance of
the character of the neighborhood is broken down through the
coming of the store or of the apartment, his civic pride and his
economic interest in the permanent welfare of the section declines.
As the home owner is replaced by the renting class, there is a further
decline of civic interest and the neighborhood that once took a live
and intelligent interest in all matters affecting its welfare becomes
absolutely dead .....8
Finally, and above all else, municipalities were expected to plan.
The Progressives loathed the absence of a comprehensive plan.
Recall that Progressives liked to equate the local community to an
organism. 88 The various organs of the body politic needed to act in
coordination with the intelligent design of the organic mind.
Progressives measured the political health of the city by the extent to
which citizens acted with a common purpose; a comprehensive
prearranged city plan was proof that they were. Thus, Benjamin
Marsh's book, An Introduction to City Planning, begins: "A city
without a plan is like a ship without a rudder."89 As leading lawyer
Frank Williams warned in an early treatise on zoning, "[flor good or
for ill, as soon as two roads of a given width cross at a given place and
angle, and a building starts at the intersection,.., its life and growth,
have been carelessly, perhaps,.., irrevocably fixed."90
All of these communitarian ideals exerted tremendous pressure on
earlier conceptions of the police power. Because Progressives
measured a city's well being by the extent to which it was planned in
advance, they saw nineteenth-century regulation as an invitation to
anarchy. Newman Baker, a land-use lawyer and author of another
prominent land-use treatise, insisted that zoning was a "necessary step
to prevent utter chaos in municipal life, coming after years of
unregulated city development."9 1 Others argued more subtly for
reforming the earlier conception. For instance, in his introductory
address to the Second City Planning Conference, Frederick Law
Olmsted defined the police power traditionally, in terms of the

87. Robert Harvey Whitten, Zoning and Living Conditions, in Proceedings of the
Thirteenth Annual Conference on City Planning 22, 25 (1921).
88. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
89. Marsh, supra note 79, at 5.
90. Frank Backus Williams, The Law of City Planning and Zoning 3 (1922).
91. Newman F. Baker, The Legal Aspects of Zoning 35 (1927).
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doctrine that "no one may be permitted so to build or otherwise
conduct himself upon his own property as to cause unreasonable
danger or annoyance to other people. 9 2 He subtly moved, however,
to define what is "unreasonable" in Progressive terms-with reference
to "gradually shifting public opinion."93
D. The Decline of Individual Property Rights
In order for the "general welfare" to expand, something else
needed to contract-the scope of owners' "private property" in the
rights to control the use of their land. Owners could retain many
incidents of ownership of land, but the law needed to transform some
incidents to guarantee common goods like aesthetics, orderliness,
stable neighborhoods and stable property values. To be sure, the
Progressives were not the only ones or the last ones to criticize the
more individually-centered conception of use rights. Even so, strands
of their critique remain influential today.
Before setting this critique forth, it is worth noting that Progressive
views varied more about property than about other features of landuse regulation. One can see the extremes in the land-use context as
well as in other contexts. Some Progressives respected the institution
of private property. For instance, as eager as Benjamin Marsh was to
introduce zoning into New York, he conceded that "any effort to
restrict the uses of such land to the basis of a lower value or to reduce
the earning capacity of the land would be regarded by the Courts as
Other Progressives were not so
confiscation of property. 9 4
sympathetic. Edward Bassett found it "unthinkable that the city must
compensate all of the private owners if reasonable aesthetic
restrictions are placed on their use of city land."9 " Frederick Howe
envied German cities because "[i]n Germany the city is as sovereign
over the property within its limits as it is over the people."9 6 He
particularly envied the power German cities enjoyed to finance
development by condemning more land than they needed and then
selling the excess improved land for a profit.9 7
Even with these extremes, it is still possible to trace out an
understanding of property rights that is distinctly "Progressive."
Mainline Progressives still respected property as a source of individual
freedom at a high level of generality and for a few key incidents of
92. Frederick Law Olmsted, Introductory Address on City Planning, in
Proceedings of the Second National Conference on City Planning 26 (1910).
93. Id. For further development of the themes in this section, see Claeys, supra
note 55.
94. Marsh, supra note 79, at 21-22.
95. Bassett, supra note 66, at 59.
96. Howe, supra note 66, at 15.
97. Id. at 14-15, 21.
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ownership. For instance, in his introductory address to the Second
Conference on City Planning, Frederick Law Olmsted insisted that
zoning rules should "leave open the maximum scope for individual
enterprise, initiative, and ingenuity that is compatible with adequate
protection of public interests."98 Yet while Progressivism respected
private property at a broad level of generality, it treated the
institution rather differently at the margins, especially with respect to
the questions that made zoning politically controversial. Olmsted's
warning is telling: he respects property as a source of individual
initiative, but only to the extent "that is compatible with adequate
protection of public interests."9 9 Free individual initiative over
property was no longer inherently a part of the public interest. It
might be part of the public interest, but it also might be in derogation
of that interest.
Here, Olmsted was echoing broad themes that led to a profound
transformation in how lawyers, regulators and judges understood the
institution of property. As Part I.B suggested, before 1900 important
strands of American property law and constitutional law conceived of
property in natural law terms."° By the 1920s, leading Progressive
jurists reasoned about constitutional property in terms of utilitarian
balancing tests, as they did in the Due Process/Takings case
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 1 Progressive political theory also
informed the objects of the legal realists who, in Thomas Merrill and
Henry Smith's description, attacked the natural law tendency to treat
property "in rem" -as a legal status which confers on its owner "the
right to exclude a large and indefinite class of other persons ('the
world') from the thing.' 1 2 As Merrill and Smith describe the realists'
object, if they could show that "property has no fixed core of meaning,
but is just a variable collection of interests established by social
convention, then there is no good reason why the state should not
freely expand or, better yet, contract the list of interests in the name
of the general welfare.' ' 0 3 Political Progressivism and legal realism
combined to attack a natural law tradition of "exclusion"-based
property rights. They replaced that tradition with a new program of

98. Olmsted, supra note 92, at 27.
99. Id.
100. See Claeys, supra note 26, at 1566-1604; see also Adam Mossoff, What Is
Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 Ariz. L. Rev. 371 (2003) (outlining the
natural law conception of property in Locke, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
natural law writers, and early American law).
101. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); see Claeys, supra note 26, at 161826.
102. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law
and Economics?, 111 Yale L.J. 357, 360 (2001).
103. Id. at 365.
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"governance"-based rights, created by public law legislation and
administered by bureaucrats.
These broader trends left their mark on the first wave of land-use
reformers. They critiqued individualistic property rights along the
lines laid down by Progressive political theory, utilitarian interest
balancing, and legal realism. On that critique, James Metzenbaum
thought it selfish for homeowners to insist on an individualisticcentered account of property. Zoning was necessary, he argued, to
protect the residential owner from "in a single day, being robbed of a
very half of the value of the home and property."'"' Edward Bassett
complained that "[p]rivate property and personal rights have been
more sedulously guarded than community requirements.' ' 15 His New
York colleague, Benjamin Marsh, demanded for New York City a
government energetic to a degree "equal to the effort and the zeal
which is now expended in the futile task of trying to make amends for
the exploitations by private citizens and the wanton disregard of the
rights of the many."'
Others thought individualist property rights imprudent. If any
owner insisted on those rights, her insistence would drag down her
own property values along with everyone else's. After all, Charles
Cheney explained, workers hesitate to buy homes and become solid
members of the middle class "for fear some one [sic] later would ruin
their investment and home neighborhood by building an apartment,
stable, laundry or public garage next door." 10 7
Worst of all, individualistic property rights were seen as reactionary,
a futile and defiant attachment to a social construct that had passed its
time. Edward Bassett illustrated this tendency when he criticized the
process of using eminent domain to take use servitudes. Eminent
domain would make "the city.., worse off than it was before. It
would be crystallized."1 8 "[A]s every living organism grows and
changes," he explained, "these easements would have to be changed
from time to time by successive applications of condemnation."' 0 9
Newman Baker defended zoning as a necessary response to the
realization that "[tihe laissez faire theory of government is no longer
tenable." 0

104. Metzenbaum, supra note 74, at 6.
105. Bassett, supra note 66, at 46.
106. Marsh, supra note 79, at 27.
107. Cheney, supra note 86, at 164.
108. E.M. Bassett, The Question Box, in Proceedings of the Fourteenth National
Conference on City Planning 159, 159 (1922).
109. Edward M. Bassett, Zoning: The Laws, Administration, and Court Decisions
During the First Twenty Years 27 (1940).
110. Baker, supra note 91, at 35; see also Clacys, supra note 55.
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E. The Rise of Experts and the Decline of Judicial Review
Finally, the Progressives elevated experts and deprecated judges.
They did so because the notion of progress transformed how they
understood law. Because progress imparted reason to politics, it
diminished the role for the rule of law as traditionally understood, as
government under specific rules of conduct that applied generally to
all citizens. It replaced rule under law with administration by
experts. 1 '
Walter Moody illustrated this point of view when he stressed that
"Chicago must no longer be a creature of chance. There must no
longer be planless building."'12 Moody assumed that the citizens of
Chicago could and must overcome chance. He assumed that the
forces of progress had resolved the really fundamental questions of
urban development. Since the ends of city life were more or less fixed
by progress, the only really important questions in city politics became
questions of means. The city no longer needed legislators to write
regulations reflecting local opinion and judges to enforce them; the
city's organic mind, as expressed by its local majority, would express
the civic will. Architects, engineers, and land-use planners had the
specialized know-how to implement the priorities that a publicspirited and Progressive community would be expected to pursue.
Thus, planners could pursue open-ended and rationalistic normative
goals like "efficiency" without concern that they were legislating
about controversial and politically-charged topics. For instance, as
Canadian planner Thomas Adams assumed, "[e]fficiency requires that
all planning should have regard to the best economic use to which
land can be put, to the provision of the soundest economic basis for
industrial development, and to the social organization of life so as to
conserve the skill and physique of the workers," all while "trying to
secure amenity... [and] provide social intercourse, pleasant home
surroundings, protection of natural beauty, and creation of structural
beauty.""' 3
The Progressives' writings presuppose such a transformation of
politics. The best respected Progressives assumed that the most
important problems in land-use planning were not political but
scientific and technical. Nelson Lewis looked forward to the day
when the city engineer would assume the role once played by the city
founder. The engineer's eyes "have been so closely fixed upon the
drawing board that he has seldom looked up to catch a vision of the
great city that is to come, the complex organism known as the modern

111. See Claeys, supra note 45 (manuscript at 7-16).
112. Moody, supra note 66, at 53.
113. Thomas Adams, The Development of the Plan, in Proceedings of the Ninth
National Conference on City Planning Proceedings 141, 148 (1917).
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city with ...its capacity to debase or to elevate its citizens."'1 4 While
planner George Ford acknowledged that "[i]t is practically a physical
impossibility for one man, in one lifetime, to acquire an adequate and
impartial appreciation of all the points of view" that go into city
planning, he was confident one could create a "lastingly satisfactory"
plan by "put[ting] the work in charge of several experts-one an
engineer, one an architect, and one, perhaps, a social expert... 5 For
Frederick Law Olmsted, these expectations for planning were not
hopes but imperatives. A scientific planner could not possibly leave
alone the "free interplay of economic forces and social impulses," not
when she could perceive "the complex interwoven web of cause and
effect that binds them all together ... ."'16 No one, Olmsted
exclaimed, would rest content with an unscientific view of planning
"after the imagination ha[d] grasped the larger possibility of
control. 117
Progressives also trusted local land-use experts to be non partisan.
Since progress had already taken most of the politics out of politics,
land-use reformers believed they could vest wide-ranging powers in
experts. They did not need, or so they thought, to worry that the
experts might offend local community opinions or misuse public
Leading administrative law and local
power for private ends.
government professor Frank Goodnow anticipated that "the trend of
American administrative development is in the direction of adopting
the continental principle" of "central administrative control,"
independent of political oversight." 8 Robert Whitten expected that a
zoning commission would "devote itself unreservedly to [public] work.
It will take a broad view of the scope of city planning. Itwill realize
that it needs the assistance of city plan experts .... It will have
something of the missionary spirit in propagating the gospel of city
'
planning."119
On the other hand, as social progress and expert planners
rationalized land use, they reduced the scope of judicial review.
Edward Bassett recognized that "every state has been built on a
fundamental law, purposely made hard to change, assuring
permanency to government and emphasising [sic] private rights, but
omitting even the mention of any rights or powers of urban
communities."'2 ° But he distinguished away this fundamental law,
114. Lewis, supra note 60, at 11.
115. George B. Ford, The City Scientific, in Fifth Conference Proceedings, supra
note 66, at 32 (emphasis added).
116. Olmsted, supra note 92, at 17-18.
117. Id.
118. Frank J. Goodnow, Municipal Home Rule, 21 Pol. Sci. Q. 77, 90 (1906).
119. Robert H. Whitten, The Constitution and Powers of a City PlanningAuthority,
in Seventh Conference Proceedings, supra note 60, at 135, 138.
120. Bassett, supra note 66, at 47.
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namely constitutional law, on the ground that "[g]reat cities had not
appeared .... In later years great cities developed with new and
unforeseen needs., 121 But, "[b]etween the strong guarantees of
personal liberty on the one side and the emphasis of the constitution
on state government on the other, a municipality constantly struggles
for suitable instruments to work out its own salvation."' 2 2
Bassett and other lawyers thus developed legal theories to make the
police power, constitutional limitations, and judicial review more
organic and adaptable. Bassett insisted that:
[A] written constitution should be construed with a recognition of
the changing needs of society and especially the community needs of
modern cities, because, unlike a statu[t]e, a constitution should be
fundamental, simple and enduring and is framed with an 23intention to
cover the changing relations that progress may develop.
To resort to Newman Baker's analogy, since zoning "laws fall in the
'legal dark continent,' i.e., in that field bounded by the older idea of
the police power on the one side and on the other by the 'due process
clause,"' one could make zoning "perfectly legal" by "expand[ing] the
police power and contract[ing] the 'due process clause."'124 Baker
reasoned, "[a]s conditions change, governmental functions change;
and our125 constitution is being expanded constantly to cover our
needs. ,
Such fundamental changes subordinated the role of the courts.
Since social progress was more fundamental than the principles
expressed in state constitutions, courts had no principled basis to cite
those constitutions as authority to prevent new forms of land-use
regulation. Some Progressives thus expressed impatience with state
and federal judges. Andrew Wright Crawford and University of
Chicago administrative law professor Ernst Freund exemplified the
range of the Progressive reformers' impatience. Crawford complained
that American judges "needed education.' 26 "If we can get over this
bogey of the constitution [sic] and if we can fully realize the essentials
of what we want," he complained, "we can probably persuade the
judges that acts to provide those essentials should be upheld as
constitutional.' ' 27 Freund, by contrast, thought all that was needed

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 53.
124. Baker, supra note 91, at 140-41.
125. Id. at 141 (citation omitted).
126. Andrew Wright Crawford, Discussion, in Fifth Conference Proceedings, supra
note 66, at 66; see also Claeys, supra note 55.
127. Crawford, supra note 126, at 66.
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1' 28
was "a liberal interpretation of the constitution [sic] by our courts.'
That interpretation, of course, came when the U.S. Supreme Court
handed down Euclid.

III. PROGRESSIVE POLITICAL THEORY AND PROGRESSIVE
JURISPRUDENCE

This Progressive-political account of zoning deserves to be taken
seriously for a few reasons. As a matter of history, it fills an important
gap in our understanding about zoning's origins. As a matter of
contemporary policy, it ought to resonate with practitioners and
scholars who work in land use. It goes a long way in describing the
character of the "public interest" ideas to which local majorities and
land-use regulators appeal when they make zoning decisions.
Most important, this political account of zoning exposes significant
gaps in the standard legal account of zoning-Haar and Wolf's
account of Progressive jurisprudence. Lawyers and scholars who
specialize in land-use regulation are not particularly familiar with the
themes explored in Part II; they are familiar instead with the story
told at the beginning of this Essay.'29 That story affects their
perceptions of zoning. They tend to assume zoning is not particularly
ideological, that its main virtues are professional and technical and not
political. They understand zoning as a necessary adaptation to the
exigencies of administering land-use disputes in a crowded and
complex country. Progressive jurisprudence then includes all the
claims about land-use rights, regulation, and the institutional
advantages of centralized planning that need to be true for this
defense of zoning to hang together.
Even so, the tenets of Progressive jurisprudence are surprisingly
easy to question. The Progressives' political case for zoning is more
integrated and comprehensive than the tenets of Progressive
jurisprudence. The former more clearly identifies and better justifies
the claims about law and politics that need to be true for zoning to
make sense. Since Progressive political theory seems so coherent, and
since Progressive jurisprudence has such gaps, it is strange that, as
Haar and Wolf recognize, it is Progressive jurisprudence that has
"weathered profound societal, political, and ideological shifts on the
Court and in the American polity."' 3 ° To appreciate why, consider the
key tenets of Progressive jurisprudence. At all the crucial points,
these tenets make little sense without some underlying theory of law
and politics substantially like the interpretation of Progressive
political theory presented in Part II.
128. Ernst Freund, Discussion, in Fifth Conference Proceedings, supra note 66, at
62-65; see also Claeys, supra note 55.
129. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
130. Haar & Wolf, supra note 6, at 2174.
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First, consider the idea of "changed circumstances." Progressive
jurisprudence makes zoning seem apolitical, innocuous, and even
inevitable. Justice George Sutherland restated the conventional legal
wisdom in his opinion for the Court in Euclid: "Until recent years,
urban life was comparatively simple; but with the great increase and
concentration of population, problems have developed, and constantly
are developing, which require, and will continue to require, additional
restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of private lands." '31
Since "[a] nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place,
like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard," Sutherland
concluded, zoning does no more than lay down a legislative and
prospective blueprint to minimize the number of land-use conflicts
that might otherwise fester in a system without planned
development.' 32 Haar and Wolf draw from these passages one
attribute of Progressive jurisprudence-its capacity to change with the
times, "the elasticity and adaptability of traditional common law
methodology. "133
These appeals to "adaptability" and "changed circumstances,"
however, beg all the important questions. It is not enough to show
that economic and development patterns changed from 1890 onward.
Each of these facts is an "is" that implies no "ought." One must also
explain why the changes discredited some possible responses to that
change (like the natural law approach that informed the law around
1900) and required other responses (like the Progressive approach
that displaced it). Indeed, if cities were getting more populated and
development was getting more complicated, it might be imprudent to
make public-law land-use regulation even more controlling and
particularized, and then even more impractical to funnel all these
land-use decisions through a centralized preapproval licensing
process. To borrow loosely from contemporary public choice theory,
if five times as many people are competing to put land to five times as
many uses, centralized licensing should be on the order of twenty-five
times more cumbersome and contentious.1 4 No matter: zoning
remains deeply committed to licensing.
The first generation of Progressives could explain this commitment
to land-use licensing more clearly than most land-use specialists today.
Unlike modern land-use specialists, they appreciated that the
fundamental questions were not the technical questions about
expertise, but the political questions about the right public interest.'35

131. Viii. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926).
132. Id. at 388.
133. Haar & Wolf, supra note 6, at 2174.
134. See Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations 53-58 (1982). See
generally Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (1971).
135. See supra Part II.E.
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They thought that, in their era, social conditions had changed enough
to downgrade moral goods like freedom and to upgrade more
collective goods, including order, community, and security.'36 For
them, zoning was a manageable process because the forces of progress
and the "organic" nature of local life created a potential into which
they could tap to organize local politics and land-use management in a
systematic way.
Second, land-use lawyers often justify zoning by invoking an ideal
of the "general welfare." Haar and Wolf interpret Euclid to say that
'
zoning may promote a "wide range of public interests,"137
138
'
"comprehensive in [their] health, safety, and welfare goals."
They
describe Euclid sympathetically because it vindicated a "bottom-up
process" in which "[l]ocal elected officials ...adjust[] for community
needs and aspirations."' ' This sentiment is entrenched in modern law
as well. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, the
Court recognized zoning laws as the classic example of laws by which
safety, morals, or general welfare' would be
"'the health,
' 40
promoted.'
This rationale is perhaps the most important conventional
justification for zoning, but it sounds more content-free than it really
is. Phrases like "wide range of public interests" and different
"community needs" make it sound as if zoning does not have a builtin tendency to promote any one understanding of the public interest.
In reality, these phrases act as something of a code. They encourage
communitarian styles of property regulation. One can appreciate the
difference between message and meaning by watching how land-use
lawyers treat Euclid. In some respects, the Supreme Court's opinion
reads rather narrowly, as an attempt to integrate zoning into
traditional principles of nuisance regulation without overturning those
principles. Nevertheless, as one leading property casebook puts it,
Euclid was quickly interpreted "as a generous endorsement of social
engineering in the name of public health, safety, and welfare. It is
beside the point whether zoning authorities actually read the case this
way; the point is that they came to act as though they did."''
By contrast, the early zoning advocates had a firm grasp on the
character of the legislative scheme they were proposing. As Walter
Moody understood, "[h]e who makes the city makes the world. After
all, though men make cities, it is cities which make men."' 42 These
136. See supra Part II.C.
137. Haar & Wolf, supra note 6, at 2194.
138. Id. at 2195.
139. Id.
140. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978) (quoting
Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928)).
141. See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 1, at 1010-11.
142. Moody, supra note 66, at 2 (quotations omitted).
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advocates interpreted their times to suggest that Americans latently
Pre-approved use districts,
desired stronger communities.
homogeneous neighborhoods, stable property values, and common
aesthetic requirements were all means to express that desire for
community-and then to hardwire that desire into subsequent
generations' character and civic life. 43 No surprise, then, if the
"general welfare" refers to policies that downgrade individual tastes
and choices and upgrade collective goods like order, homogeneity,
community, and security.
Third, zoning law and theory is deeply committed to expertiseadministration by expert urban planners. Haar and Wolf celebrate
that "[t]he Progressive Era witnessed the triumph of American
professionalism '"" and the shift to "appropriate, though certainly not
total, deference [by courts] to the expertise and special knowledge of
this new breed of professionals." 4' 5 The Supreme Court gave land-use
expertise respectability in Euclid, when it deferred to the findings of
expert "commissions" that published "comprehensive reports," which
"b[ore] every evidence of painstaking consideration."' 4 6 According to
Richard Babcock, longtime dean of the land-use law community,
zoning originally expected "a bunch of happy, well-informed people
with a social I.Q. of 150 [to] sit around making decisions in complete
freedom from outside pressure ....[T]hese people are still making
zoning decisions. '
Here, as elsewhere, however, the conventional wisdom in land-use
law needs better theoretical justification than it can provide on its
own. In what matters should experts receive deference-technical
questions, or political and moral questions, too? The Supreme Court
deferred to such expert findings as the following: Zoning makes it
easier to provide fire services; it encourages the rearing of children; it
reduces nervous disorders; and, most notoriously, it stops apartment
houses from leeching off the green and quiet in residential
neighborhoods like "mere parasite[s]."'14 8 Planners may know how to
put fire stations near where buildings are most likely to burn, but how
does that technical expertise qualify them to make a moral judgment
that apartment owners and tenants are social freeloaders? And why
must courts defer to such judgments?' 4 9

143. See supra Part II.C.
144. Haar & Wolf, supra note 6, at 2182.
145. Id. at 2183.
146. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,394 (1926).
147. Richard F. Babcock, The Zoning Game: Municipal Practices and Policies 19
(1966).
148. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394-95.
149. Haar and Wolf describe Euclid as the model of a "workable middle ground
between total deference to professional findings and de novo review." Haar and
Wolf, supra note 6, at 2183 (emphasis added). As the example in this paragraph
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Land-use law has no obvious answer, but Progressive political
theory does: the experts get their legitimacy from the will of the
community.150 Communities have an "organic" sense, which is
expressed through the community political process, and also in the
preliminary stages of the planning and zoning processes. In the
Progressives' interpretation, the organic nature of political life
contributes to shaping its character; local political communities then
add detail by expressing their own particular collective goals. Local
experts can make politically-sensitive choices on the ground that they
are helping the cities whom they represent to express their latent
desires for community.
Last, and most important, is the institution of property. Haar and
Wolf begin their essay by celebrating the fact that, even near the close
of the Rehnquist Court, there is still "no fundamental constitutional
right to the speculative value of a piece of property."' 5' They interpret
the Progressive Era to have abandoned a tradition of property as
"abstract, disembodied rights," and to have embraced instead "the
holistic and interdependent approach of Euclid and its Progressive
' This new understanding of property (and this implicit
progeny."152
derision for other, freedom-centered approaches) remains a powerful
Progressive legacy.

In dissent in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal

Council, Justice Stevens spoke on behalf of land-use planners
everywhere when he insisted that "[t]he human condition is one of
constant learning and evolution-both moral and practical.
Legislatures implement that new learning; in doing so they must often
revise the definition of property and the rights of property owners."' 53
But as should be clear by now, to defend this conception of
property rights, one must embrace political commitments substantially
like those held during the Progressive Era. When Haar and Wolf
ridicule "abstract, disembodied rights,"' 54 they are suggesting that it is
difficult or impossible to conceive of "property" as the general right to
use and develop property. However, enough scholars have articulated
and defended an "exclusion"-based view of property by now that one
may not discredit this view simply by lampooning it on doctrinal
grounds. Haar, Wolf, and land-use specialists are free to reject
general use rights on substantive grounds, but they need to make their
suggests, Euclid lies far closer to the "total deference" side of the spectrum than it
does toward the "de novo" side, and that is how the case has been read. See, e.g.,
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978) (citing Euclid to
uphold land-use regulations that destroy or adversely affect property interests if the
regulations reasonably relate to the state's general welfare).
150. See supra Part II.E.
151. Haar & Wolf, supra note 6, at 2158.
152. Id. at 2191; see also id. at 2187-91.
153. Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1069 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
154. Haar & Wolf, supra note 6, at 2191.
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substantive commitments clearer. When Haar and Wolf prefer a
"holistic and interdependent approach"' 5 5 to property regulation, they
express a preference for a "governance" scheme in which experts and
local majorities distribute use rights to individual owners. But they do
not explain why this approach is sound. To do so, they would need to
explain why the Progressives were right, why regulation should be
more communitarian, and why property should be transformed from a
source of individual freedom into a source of community and security.
They would also need to explain why the realists' "bundle of rights"
approach to property leads to better consequences than the physicalinvasion test or other doctrinal proxies for a more comprehensive and
Realism subtly
individually-centered conception of property.
transforms property rights into a series of pairwise relational rights
marked off by experts. It is not clear beyond cavil that realism's
conception of property is operationally sounder than one which gives
owners simple and absolute rights against the rest of the world, and
which leaves most land-use policy decisions in the hands of owners
rather than experts. On the question of what is property, perhaps the
most important question in land-use regulation, what Haar and Wolf
call Progressive jurisprudence assumes the truth of controversial
substantive and conceptual claims advanced prominently during the
Progressive Era.
I cannot explain here in any comprehensive way why there exists
such a discrepancy between the original political and the
contemporary legal accounts of zoning. I strongly suspect one
contributing factor is the difference between theory and practice.
Contemporary land-use lawyers and scholars may assume that the
Progressive lawyers and reformers discussed in Part II settled the
important questions about zoning, just as those Progressives probably
assumed that Woodrow Wilson and academics of his rank had settled
the important questions about government on which they relied to
Another factor relates to the
develop their theory of zoning.
difference between politics and lawyering. As Part I.B suggested, prezoning land-use regulation-in its common law, legislative, and
constitutional dimensions-may have followed in large part from a
theory of law and politics radically different from the theory that
inspired Euclidean zoning. Even if some areas of nineteenth-century
law broke from natural-law/natural-rights
prescriptions, the
Progressives certainly regarded those prescriptions as an obstacle to
be overcome or avoided. 56 To put zoning on solid legal footing,
lawyers and judges needed to tone down some of its most novel and
Progressive features to make it seem continuous with the natural law
themes present in the property and constitutional law of the time.
155. Id.
156. See supra notes 104-10, 120-28 and accompanying text.
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Euclid illustrates as well as any one example could. When James
Metzenbaum wrote the opening appellate brief for the Village of
Euclid, he laced it with many of the reformist and organic themes of
Progressive political theory set forth in Part 11.57 When the case was
held over a Term, however, and as zoning advocates grew concerned
about the case, Alfred Bettman filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf
of the National Conference on City Planning. Bettman's brief went to
far greater lengths to make Euclid's zoning plan seem continuous with
nineteenth-century conceptions of nuisance-based police power
regulation. 5 ' In many respects, the Supreme Court's opinion follows
the more incrementalist approach Bettman charted in his amicus brief
for the experts, and endorsed many crucial features of the
conventional story just presented above.'59
Nevertheless, if this explanation is correct, it only reinforces the
doubts as to whether Progressive jurisprudence can do the heavy
lifting needed to defend and justify zoning. Good lawyering has
different objects from good legal theory and good political theory.
Good lawyering helped make zoning seem continuous with previous
forms of land-use regulation, but that appearance of continuity
blurred zoning's most distinctive features. Anyone who wants to
judge zoning on its merits will probably need to consider Progressive
jurisprudence only as shored up by some theory of law and politics
substantially like the Progressives' organic political theory.
To be sure, this part has not discredited Progressive jurisprudence.
It has only shown that Progressive jurisprudence depends heavily on
the Progressive political theory sketched out in Part II, or on some
theory of law and politics substantially like it. That connection
certainly suffices to make clear that Progressive jurisprudence is not
as comprehensive and considered as it would need to be to be
regarded as a leading school of legal thought. At the same time,
157. See Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 60-61, Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (No. 665) (suggesting that the Court take cognizance of the
strong preponderant opinion in favor of zoning); id. at 64-65 (arguing that, in the
absence of zoning, one "selfish shop" can "steal" or "destroy" the property values of
neighbors); id. at 69-73 (arguing that zoning is essential to preserve the character of
American home life); id. at 81-82 (insisting that zoning was a response of police power
to changing conditions).
158. See Brief on Behalf of Amici Curiae National Conference of City Planning et.
al. at 23-30, Euclid, 272 U.S. at 365 (justifying zoning under a traditional nuisancebased conception of the police power and disclaiming any intention to zone for
aesthetic purposes).
159. I am indebted to Dan Mandelker for this insight and example. Mandelker
doubts my interpretation of the sources covered in Part II. He cites Bettman's brief
as a more accurate representation of the intentions of Progressive land-use lawyers.
To the contrary, I think Bettman's brief simply confirms that lawyers who subscribed
to the political critique explained in Part II were willing to downplay their basic legal
and political commitments in their briefs to win a case.
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zoning is not automatically weak or problematic simply because the
principles that inform its practice day to day have been explained
better somewhere else. If leading land-use scholars like Haar and
Wolf find the Progressives' organic theory of law and politics
hospitable, the lessons of this Essay will seem a friendly amendment.
If not, the lessons will seem more like a poison pill. The important
point is that conventional land-use lawyers and scholars probably
cannot defend zoning in theoretically rigorous fashion with the
arguments with which they are most familiar unless they are prepared
to supplement those arguments with a theory of law and politics
substantially like Progressive political theory.
IV. UNEASE ABOUT PROGRESSIVISM IN ZONING

This connection brings us to the last question: Might Progressive
political theory serve as the formidable contender that Haar and Wolf
hope Progressive jurisprudence is? Although I cannot answer this
question in any comprehensive way, it is worth the effort at least to
try. The principles of Progressive political theory set forth in this
Essay describe many important aspects of the conception of the
"public interest" that informs everyday land-use policy. As it turns
out, problems in the theory have important parallels in most
observers' perceptions about zoning. The parallels suggest that
problems observers see in zoning's practice may be inextricably tied to
zoning's design and institutional structure.
Separately, this review of Progressive political theory helps clarify
the academic scholarship on zoning. Many articles do not treat zoning
in terms of political theory. They may stay closer to the phenomena
residents and observers see in everyday life, or they may appeal to
normative or behavioral theories that are not primarily political. In
reality, however, even a cursory comparison suggests that Progressive
political theory operates within normative and behavioral horizons
that differ drastically from the horizons of more recent theories of law
and politics, the ones which Haar and Wolf regard as leading
contenders. As a result, the contrasts in politics help describe the lay
of the land in zoning scholarship. They help explain why some schools
of scholarship tend to be institutionally sympathetic to zoning, while
other schools remain more skeptical.
While the following survey is not meant to be comprehensive by
any stretch, normative legal scholarship on zoning generally comes in
three main types: communitarian, law and economics, and "law and
society." The last term refers, somewhat awkwardly, to various
scholars who focus on the ways in which law conditions people's
values and identities, and particularly on the ways in which people
tend to use law to create status groups. It includes, but is certainly not
limited to, critical legal studies scholars.

2004]

EUCLID LIVES?

765

The Progressives' political justification for zoning explains why
communitarians tend to be sympathetic to zoning and why the other
two camps tend to be skeptical about it. Communitarians tend to be
sympathetic to zoning because the Progressives made descriptive
assumptions about human nature and normative claims about human
happiness that closely resemble contemporary communitarian
arguments. Gerald Frug illustrates many of the parallels in his recent
book City Making, an extended justification of a postmodern/communitarian approach to local government. 60 Like the
Progressives, Frug laments the atomization of local civic life. He aims
to recover a sense of "[p]opular participation" in civic life by
"replac[ing] reliance on the mass media with personally acquired
information and to create the sense of a common venture necessary
for any meaningful definition of the 'public interest."'161
The Progressives' political case for zoning anticipates and spells out
the kinds of assumptions that must be true before government can
create the senses of "popular participation" and "public interest" to
which Frug is appealing. The Progressives held that the social sides of
people's beings are fairly plastic and malleable, subject to influence
from the communities and the experiences that form them;'62 Frug
holds that people have no subjective content until they "forge a
coherent self out of an experience of a swarm of objects, fantasies, and
sensations.., to identify with something-like an image in the
mirror-other than the self." '63 On this account, if people are going to

have any chance to avoid atomization and alienation by participating
in a meaningful social experience, they need small communities and
strong local mores around which to organize their subjective selves.
In short, the Progressives more or less sketched out the kind of
politics, regulation, and institutions a community needs to respond to
the problem Frug lamented when he claimed that "the self is formed
only through a relationship with others."' 4
At the same time, law and economics and "law and society"
approaches remain more skeptical of zoning-and especially of
Progressive or communitarian arguments for it-because they doubt
that people are as oriented toward communitarian goals as
160. Gerald E. Frug, City Making: Building Communities without Building Walls
(1999).
161. Id. at 21 (citing John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems 143-84 (1972)).
162. See supra notes 47-55, 61-67 and accompanying text.
163. Frug, supra note 160, at 93.
164. Id. at 73. Not all communitarian scholarship favors zoning. In particular, the
"New Urbanist" movement is generally skeptical of zoning because it encourages
suburbanization and sprawl, which in turn undermine classical conceptions of
community. See, e.g., Charter of the New Urbanism (Michael Leccese & Kathleen
McCormick eds., 2000); Andrfs Duany et al., Suburban Nation: The Rise of Sprawl
Frug, however, is more
and the Decline of the American Dream (2000).
representative of the legal literature.
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Progressives and communitarians have assumed. The leading skeptics
While Progressives and
are law and economics scholars.
communitarians hold that man can overcome his selfish and
passionate attachments through concerted social action, economic
scholarship tends to stress that the selfish tendencies are not so easy to
escape.
From that perspective, zoning does not enlarge or transform the
scope of owners' interests. Far from it. Zoning provides a regulatory
structure within which local players can advance their narrow financial
interests far more effectively than they could in a more decentralized
structure of regulation. Homeowners may use zoning the same way
businesses use health, safety, and licensing regulation-to limit the
supply of available houses, and thereby to increase the financial value
of their homes.'6 5 Of course, different law and economics scholars
draw different conclusions from these common starting assumptions.
Some, most notably William Fischel, maintain that zoning can be
justified in terms of "efficiency," on the ground it helps local
majorities maximize their collective preferences about land-use
regulation. Fischel calls the members of these majorities
167
"homevoters."' 166 By contrast, others, including Robert Ellickson
and Richard Epstein,168 conclude that zoning increases the costs of
regulation without increasing social welfare.
In either case, however, law and economics takes over the terms of
the debate, shifting it away from Progressive ideas about community
and public interest to economic ideas about the efficient maximization
of narrow economic interest. That take over should not be a happy
prospect for traditional land-use planners and scholars. As a worstcase scenario, consider what the economists did to New Deal utility
regulation, a body of law to which zoning is quite similar. 169 In the
1970s and 1980s, economically-trained regulators took over publicutility regulation and abandoned New Deal planning for an ambitious
program of deregulation. 70 Even in the best-case scenario, it would
still be a significant blow for conventional land-use scholars to lose
control of the policy agenda in land-use law to economists.
165. See, e.g., William A. Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values
Influence Local Government Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies
(2001). For one classic restatement of how public choice groups can "capture" publicinterested regulation, see George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971).
166. See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 165; Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property
Taxation in a System of Local Government, 12 Urb. Stud. 205 (1975).
167. See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternative to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules,
and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 681, 694 (1973).
168. See Richard A. Epstein, A Conceptual Approach to Zoning: What's Wrong
with Euclid, 5 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 277,283, 290-91 (1996).
169. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
170. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of
Regulated Industries Law, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1323 (1998).
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By contrast, law and society scholarship is skeptical about zoning
for a separate set of reasons. Law and society scholars worry that
individuals form perceptions of utility and value around rivalrous
goods-goods which bring someone up only if he pushes someone else
down. From that perspective, law and society scholars break with
communitarians and Progressives because they suspect that strong,
public-interested regulations will often be used to elevate some groups
and subordinate others.
To illustrate, Lee Anne Fennell has written powerfully about the
Far from giving homeowners a
class implications of zoning.
meaningful sense of life, she argues, zoning encourages a vicious
bourgeois cycle, in which "[h]omeowners are held in thrall by their
homes-tempted by tax breaks, goaded by social pressures, strangled
by outsized mortgages, and far too easily spooked by remote or
imagined threats to their hard-won and tenuously held 'way of life."" 71
Richard Thompson Ford has written of the racial implications. He
asserted, "[tihe 'democratic process' that produces and legitimates
exclusionary zoning is... very questionable: in many cases, the only
significant vote that will be taken on the exclusionary ordinance is the
first vote. After it is enacted, exclusionary zoning has a selfperpetuating quality."' 72 These critiques leave many scholars with
uneasy suspicions about zoning's legitimacy and viability.
So which of these various perspectives best captures how zoning
works in practice? While I cannot answer that question fully here, let
me voice my suspicions about why law and economics and law and
society critiques are closer to the mark. One case example is no
substitute for thorough, normative, and empirical analysis, but it is still
extremely telling that Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel'73 is widely recognized as a poster child for
many of the deepest problems in zoning-the distortion of markets
for land, its association with racial and class tensions, and above all
the NIMBY ("Not In My Backyard!") phenomenon. 174 Indeed, in
as proof
their casebook on land use, Haar and Wolf cite Mount Laurel
1' 75
"that zoning and socioeconomic exclusion were intertwined.'
171. Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 Yale L.J. 617, 636 (2002) (reviewing
Fischel, supra note 165).
172. Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in
Legal Analysis, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1843, 1871 (1994). Professor Haar has identified
some of the same problems in separate scholarship. See Charles M. Haar, The
Twilight of Land-Use Controls: A ParadigmShift?, 30 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1011 (1996).
173. 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975), appeal dismissed & cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
174. See, e.g., Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 1, at 1065-91 (excerpting Mount
Laurel and discussing the case extensively); Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, Introduction:
Exclusionary Land-use Regulations, 41 Urb. Stud. 255 (2004) (introducing a
symposium focused entirely on the problem of exclusionary zoning); Symposium,
Twists in the Pathfrom Mount Laurel, 30 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 433 (2003).
175. Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan Wolf, Land-Use Planning: A Casebook on
the Use, Misuse, and Re-Use of Urban Land 376 (4th ed. 1989).
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Mount Laurel, a suburb of Camden, New Jersey (and, indirectly,
Philadelphia) adopted a series of zoning ordinances that reflect the
preferences of a majority of Fischel's homevoters. 176 The town zoned
approximately one percent of the township's land for retail,
approximately twenty-nine percent for light industry, and the rest for
single-family, detached dwellings.'77 The residential zones included
lot and floor square-footage requirements that effectively excluded
low-income housing. 78 The township then negotiated with developers
to build alternate forms of housing for high-income newcomers. 179 It
discouraged housing for low-income earners and large families; it
limited how many multi-bedroom apartments developers could build
in town; and it forced developers to promise to cover tuition and other
school expenses if they underestimated how many children new
homebuyers would bring to town."8 Developers also subsidized an
increase in the township's public sector by contributing large sums of
money for educational facilities, a cultural center, and a library. 8' In
contrast, when a private nonprofit applied to the Mount Laurel
Township Committee for permission to build state-subsidized
affordable housing, the Committee required it to build such housing
on 20,000 square-foot lots, which made the housing not "affordable"
18 2
by the standards of affordable-housing advocates or the poor.
Mount Laurel powerfully illustrates how zoning's idealism falls
short in practice. Local majorities used zoning to support the prices of
their homes and exclude poorer would-be residents, developers
applied public-choice pressures to get exemptions, and administrators
responded to those pressures to acquire new land and revenue
streams to build political power bases. Taken together with similar
policies by other suburbs, Mount Laurel's policies helped choke the
supply of available housing for low- and middle-income families
throughout the state.
Other factors, no doubt, help explain the Mount Laurel story. And
yet, one piece of the story is the fact that the original zoning laws
assumed too Progressive and optimistic an account of human nature.
The irony in Mount Laurel is especially rich because the New Jersey
Supreme Court excoriated the town of Mount Laurel on Progressive
grounds. The court accused the city of trying "to keep down local
taxes on property.., without regard for non-fiscal considerations with
respect to people."'83 "Almost every" city, the court complained, "acts
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solely in its own selfish and parochial interest and in effect builds a
wall around itself to keep out those people or entities not adding
favorably to the tax base."" 4 But what if Progressive ideals
overestimate how far community, order, and security can suppress
people's selfish and rivalrous tendencies? If so, then the local
developers, homeowners, and regulators throughout New Jersey's
suburbs were all doing what common sense would predict they would
do.
If this interpretation of Mount Laurel is accurate, then "Progressive
jurisprudence," as Haar and Wolf call it, has come with a profound
cost: Members of the land-use community may not be able to see the
problems in zoning clearly because they do not understand how the
problems connect to the basic political orientation of zoning. Mount
Laurel also illustrates this irony. The trial court had concluded that
the proper remedy was to declare Mount Laurel's zoning system
unconstitutional." 5 The New Jersey Supreme Court was not prepared
to go so far. While the court was certainly skeptical about local
zoning, it followed five decades of legal thought in assuming there was
no other practical alternative: "The municipal function," it assumed,
"is initially to provide the opportunity [to build housing] through
'
appropriate land use regulations."186
The same problem comes out when one considers how the New
Jersey Supreme Court viewed the institution of property. To stop the
discrimination it saw, the court declared that Mount Laurel owed an
affirmative duty to supply adequate housing. 8 7 In other words, the
court gave poorer residents an entitlement to affordable housing.
Ironically, however, the legal basis for this entitlement was the first
paragraph of the New Jersey Constitution, which guaranteed the
"natural and unalienable rights ... of acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property."'88 If the Supreme Court had been alert to the
character of these natural rights, it might have reconsidered the
approach Judge Westenhaver pursued when he applied a similar
provision of the Ohio Constitution in Euclid more than fifty years
earlier." 9 To be sure, such an approach would have threatened some
aspects of zoning, especially aesthetic and strict single-family-use
regulations. But the flip side is that this approach would have given
developers a powerful legal tool to choose to build affordable housing

184. Id.
185. See id. at 716.
186. Id. at 734.
187. See id. at 727-28.
188. See id. at 725 n.11 (quoting N.J. Const. art. I, 1 ("All persons are by nature
free and independent, and have certain natural and inalienable rights, among which
are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.")).
189. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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and discriminated-against minorities a powerful tool to buy it. Better
to let developers and poorer citizens help each other, than to expect
both to convince a state legislature to impose affordable housing
duties on local governments and state regulators to enforce those
duties effectively.
Moreover, even if the court had not been prepared to make that
trade-off, it still would have done well to consider the choices. If the
court had remained committed to zoning, the natural law/natural
rights sources would have predicted it would have needed to accept a
certain amount of local group discrimination as an inevitable and
uncontrollable consequence. To enjoy the sweet side of zoning, the
court might have learned to swallow the bitter.
CONCLUSION

If the Mount Laurel court had understood the lessons of this Essay,
it need not have been as resigned to zoning as it was. As this Essay
has shown, zoning promotes a conception of the public interest closely
tied to Progressive political theory. Like many modern lawyers and
scholars, the Mount Laurel judges forgot the connection between
zoning and the Progressive vision of order, security, beauty, and above
all else, community. That is the uneasy legacy of "Progressive
jurisprudence." This jurisprudence has helped put zoning on solid
political and legal footing because it casts zoning as an institution
basically consistent with many different approaches to property
regulation. But this jurisprudence has come with a cost. Because it
downplays the distinct political features of zoning, it obscures zoning's
Progressive
basic commitments and institutional tendencies.
jurisprudence discourages scholars, judges, and lawyers from
considering whether some of the unfortunate consequences of zoning
trace back to its basic design in Progressive political theory.

